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Which came first, humans or consciousness?

Which came first, humans or consciousness?

“A provocative new book by Arthur Reber argues that bacteria are conscious and that the origins of mind are found in the simplest, single-celled organisms that arose billions of years ago. Here are some alternative answers to the question of when consciousness began. 

Hypotheses About the Origins of Consciousness

  1. Consciousness has always existed, because God is conscious and eternal.
  2. Consciousness began when the universe formed, around 13.7 billion years ago (panpsychism). 
  3. Consciousness began with single-celled life, around 3.7 billion years ago (Reber). 
  4. Consciousness began with multicellular plants, around 850 million years ago. 
  5. Consciousness began when animals such as jellyfish got thousands of neurons, around 580 million years ago. 
  6. Consciousness began when insects and fish developed larger brains with about a million neurons (honeybees) or 10 million neurons (zebrafish) around 560 million years ago. 
  7. Consciousness began when animals such as birds and mammals developed much larger brains with hundreds of millions of neurons, around 200 million years ago. 
  8. Consciousness began with humans, homo sapiens, around 200,000 years ago.
  9. Consciousness began when human culture became advanced, around 3,000 years ago (Julian Jaynes).  
  10. Consciousness does not exist, as it is just a scientific mistake (behaviorism} or a “user illusion” (Daniel Dennett). 

I think that number 7 (consciousness began with mammals and birds) is currently the most plausible hypothesis, but the issue deserves examination. 

How Can You Tell Something Is Conscious? 

Except for your own introspection, consciousness is not directly observable, so it can only be inferred through the available evidence. This form of inference is common in science and everyday life—for example, when scientists accept the existence of non-observable entities such as the Big Bang, electrons, forces, and genes because they provide a better explanation than alternative hypotheses, based on the full range of available evidence.

How do you know that you are conscious? One piece of evidence is that you feel you are conscious—but this might be a mistake, as behaviorists and some philosophers have argued. Fortunately, there is additional evidence that you are conscious, including your verbal reports of conscious experiences, and your complex behaviors such as ones related to pain, emotions, and imagery that can be explained by your having these conscious experiences.

Moreover, there are beginning to be deeper neurological explanations of how consciousness comes about through interactions of numerous brain areas. So inference to the best explanation supports the hypothesis that you are conscious, as superior to the alternative hypothesis that you only act as if you are conscious. 

The same form of reasoning supports the conclusion that other human beings are also conscious. You do not have direct access to the experiences of others, but you can observe their behaviors related to pain, emotion, and imagination, and you can hear their reports of conscious experience. Moreover, the brain structures and processes in other people are very similar to yours.

Alternative explanations, such as that other people are zombies without consciousness, have no evidence to support them. Therefore, it is plausible that other people are conscious just like you. This is not just a weak argument from analogy, but an inference to the best explanation that relies on the fact that the evidence and explanations for the consciousness of other people are almost as convincing as the arguments for yourself.

The evidence for consciousness in nonhuman animals is weaker, because they cannot report their conscious experiences. In a previous blog post, I conducted a debate on whether animals have emotions, which is difficult because there are alternative explanations for why animals such as cats and dogs seem to have emotions. Maybe their apparent happiness is just reward-related behavior, and maybe their apparent fear is just threat-related behavior.

However, as I will report in a future blog post, I have become convinced that grief is widespread in mammals such as elephants, chimpanzees, and dogs, where their actions are too complicated to be explained by simple behavioral accounts. Therefore, I now think that the best explanation of mammal behaviors related to pain, pleasure, and complex emotions is that they have conscious experiences. The same arguments apply to big-brained birds such as ravens and parrots that are capable of complex problem solving and learning.  

The evidence becomes much sparser if you move down to smaller-brained animals such as bees and fish. Honeybees do exhibit reward-related behaviors, and fish exhibit pain-related behaviors, but it is not at all clear that these require an explanation based on conscious experience. At best, we can put a question mark beside hypothesis number 6.

Similarly, simpler animals such as jellyfish and even plants can show behaviors such as sensing, reacting to sensory inputs, and signaling in response to environmental influences, but there are simple, stimulus-response explanations of what they were doing that do not require the attribution of consciousness.

Bacteria

So why does Reber think that bacteria are conscious? He correctly notes that single-celled organisms have powerful ways of sensing their environments to detect sources of food and toxicity. Moreover, bacteria live in biofilms of large numbers of individuals that communicate with each by secreting chemicals that spread important environmental information about food and toxins. Bacteria are capable of moving individually and collectively to get closer to food and farther from toxic substances. Perhaps sensing, reacting, communicating, and moving are best explained by the hypothesis that bacteria have some degree of consciousness. 

But machines are also capable of sensing, reacting, communicating, and moving—for example, the self-driving cars that are being developed by Google, Uber, General Motors, and other companies. Reber thinks not only that such machines are not currently conscious, but that they never could be, because he accepts the discredited thought experiment  of John Searle that artificial intelligence is impossible because the symbols used by machines are inherently meaningless. Christopher Parisien and I argued a decade ago that self-driving cars are capable of semantics in the same way as human brains, through interacting with the world and learning about it. So machines that interact with the world can have meaningful representations even though they do not yet have consciousness. 

Engineers know exactly how self-driving cars work because they built them, and can explain their operations without invoking consciousness. Self-driving cars do not display behaviors such as pain, emotions, and imagery that consciousness helps to explain in birds and mammals. Self-driving cars and even thermostats refute Reber’s claim that when an event is sensed it is felt.

Another oddity of Reber’s view is that he thinks that plants, which evolved from single-celled organisms, lack consciousness, even though they are capable of sensing, reacting, signaling other plants, and reorienting themselves toward the sun. 

Reber’s main reasons for attributing consciousness to single-celled organisms are not that it provides the best explanation of the available evidence, but rather that this attribution solves philosophical problems. He thinks that his theory of the cellular basis of consciousness provides the most plausible answer to the problem of emergence. Consciousness is a property of objects very different from simple properties such as consisting of atoms and molecules, or even firings of neurons; thus, all of hypotheses 2-9 face the problem of figuring out how consciousness became a property of wholes when it is not a property of their parts or a simple aggregate of the properties of their parts. article continues after advertisement

Fortunately, there are new theories of how consciousness could emerge as a property of large numbers of individual neurons even though it is not a property of individual neurons. Stanislas Dehaene thinks that emergence comes from the broadcast of information across brain areas, whereas I argue in my new book Brain-Mind that the key properties are patterns of firing of neurons, binding of these patterns into more complex patterns, and competition among the resulting patterns. 

Both of these hypotheses about the emergence of consciousness in large brains have the advantage that they attribute consciousness to just those organisms for which there is evidence concerning pain, emotions, and imagery. We have no reason to attribute pain, emotions, or imagery to bacteria, so the attribution of consciousness is superfluous.

Another philosophical reason that Reber gives for his cellular basis of consciousness is that it provides a solution to the philosophical “hard problem” of consciousness: there is something that it is like to be conscious. But Reber’s view does no better than others in accounting for the feeling aspects of consciousness, which can better be handled by breaking the problem down into specific aspects of pain and specific aspects of emotion. Without wallowing in the vagueness of “what it is like,” specific aspects of conscious experience of emotion and imagery can be given neuralexplanations, as I show in Brain-Mind.

Therefore, Reber’s theory of the cellular basis of consciousness helps little with the philosophical problems of emergence and experience. Given his appreciation of scientific evidence, he should be able to recognize that the evidence for consciousness in single-celled organisms is much worse than the evidence for consciousness in self-driving cars, which already exhibit much more complex sensing, reacting, moving, and communicating than bacteria. Moreover, there are progressing alternative hypotheses of how consciousness emerges through the complex operations of large brains capable of representing the world, learning about it, representing representations, and communicating with other brains. 

Although I think that Reber is wrong about bacterial consciousness, I recommend reading his book. It is full of interesting scientific information, trenchant discussions of important issues, and entertaining stories. Sometimes, mistaken ideas can contribute to intellectual progress.”

References

Reber, A. S. (2019). The first minds:  Caterpillars, ‘karyotes, and consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.

Thagard, P. (2019). Brain-mind: From neurons to consciousness and creativity. New York: Oxford University Press.

What is the greatest lesson to learn from heartbreak?

1. Love Isn’t Everything.

“7 reasons. 1. Love Isn’t Everything. At the end of the day, most humans are on the hunt for love. The majority of us want to find a partner to share our lives with, which is a totally normal and respectable desire. However, it’s only when you experience a heartbreak that you realize that love isn’t everything. Only after you’ve had a loving relationship and lost it can you truly grasp the idea that love isn’t the magic answer to all the problems in your life. In fact, sometimes letting love go is the healthier option. A loving relationship should enhance your life, but it’s far from the most important aspect of it.

2. Love Isn’t Enough

Beyond the fact that love isn’t the only thing that matters in the world, it’s also just not enough on its own. You can love someone with your whole heart, but if you don’t have the same goals, don’t share the same values or can’t communicate effectively, your relationship is never going to work. It’s a tough lesson, and it really only hits home after you’ve gone through a tough breakup.

Those are the moments when you realize that all the love in the world isn’t enough to smooth over some very real relationship problems. It’s hard to accept, but it’s important to know that you can’t rely on love alone if you want to have healthy relationships in the future.

3. Everything Happens for a Reason

It’s the granddaddy of cliché phrases, but this saying isn’t ever more applicable than after you’ve experienced a heartbreak. As much as you don’t want to hear it, there’s always a purpose behind your breakup, and that purpose will always reveal itself. It may take weeks, months or even years before you fully understand, but heartbreak will eventually allow you to believe that everything does happen for a reason.

Even if you can’t recognize it in the moment, there was something about that person or relationship that wasn’t right for you. Allow yourself to be upset, but also remember that with time the reason behind your breakup will reveal itself.

4. You Can’t Judge Someone Else’s Pain

Romantic relationships and breakups are both intensely private experiences. You’ve probably witnessed someone close to you go through a breakup in the past and wondered why they were being so sensitive or dramatic about it. It’s not until you experience your own heartbreak that you can truly grasp the pain and misery associated with it. It’s awful, but it also makes you more empathetic and understanding about the idea that you can’t judge someone else’s pain.

5. Self-Sufficiency Is Key

The only person you can consistently count on in life is yourself. It sounds jaded and pessimistic, but it’s the truth—and heartbreak brings that fact right into the spotlight. When you have a romantic partner, you learn to count on them and rely on them to help you through things in your life. When you experience heartbreak, that support system is suddenly taken away, which is why recovering from a breakup is so difficult. However, going through that painful separation will also reveal how important it is to be self-sufficient.

You can’t rely on your partner to pick up the slack when you can’t take care of yourself. Not only does that put unneeded pressure on your relationship, it also keeps you from growing as a person and following your own goals. It’s not that you shouldn’t use your partner for support, it’s simply a matter of learning that you have to maintain your own independence, even when you’re in a romantic relationship.

6. You Have to Accept Responsibility for Your Actions

No matter how it happens, the end of a relationship is almost never one-sided. One partner may have stepped too far out of bounds or done something that couldn’t be forgiven, but that doesn’t mean you’re totally innocent in the decline of your relationship. In the aftermath of a breakup, you’ll start to take a good, long look at your relationship, and you’ll likely realize many areas where you made mistakes.

Heartbreak forces you to take a look in the mirror and address some truths about yourself that might be hard to swallow. It teaches you to accept responsibility for your actions in a way that no other life experience really can. It’s hard and frustrating, but it allows you to take an introspective look at yourself and make changes that will improve things in the future.

7. It’s Not the End of the World

A broken heart sounds like a scary thing. And honestly? It is. It’s painful and difficult to get over, but it’s not until you experience the heartbreak that you can understand that it’s a manageable misery. It’s not something you would wish on anyone, but it’s also something everyone can get through. You’ll feel hurt, you’ll be sad and you’ll swear you’ll never love anyone again, but eventually the pain will subside and you’ll find yourself ready and open to an even greater love in the future. Heartbreak isn’t fun, but it’s also not the end of the world.

Which came first, humans or consciousness?

“Ever since Charles Darwin published On the Origin of Species in 1859, evolution has been the grand unifying theory of biology. Yet one of our most important biological traits, consciousness, is rarely studied in the context of evolution. Theories of consciousness come from religion, from philosophy, from cognitive science, but not so much from evolutionary biology. Maybe that’s why so few theories have been able to tackle basic questions such as: What is the adaptive value of consciousness? When did it evolve and what animals have it?

The Attention Schema Theory (AST), developed over the past five years, may be able to answer those questions. The theory suggests that consciousness arises as a solution to one of the most fundamental problems facing any nervous system: Too much information constantly flows in to be fully processed. The brain evolved increasingly sophisticated mechanisms for deeply processing a few select signals at the expense of others, and in the AST, consciousness is the ultimate result of that evolutionary sequence. If the theory is right—and that has yet to be determined—then consciousness evolved gradually over the past half billion years and is present in a range of vertebrate species.

Even before the evolution of a central brain, nervous systems took advantage of a simple computing trick: competition. Neurons act like candidates in an election, each one shouting and trying to suppress its fellows. At any moment only a few neurons win that intense competition, their signals rising up above the noise and impacting the animal’s behavior. This process is called selective signal enhancement, and without it, a nervous system can do almost nothing.

We can take a good guess when selective signal enhancement first evolved by comparing different species of animal, a common method in evolutionary biology. The hydra, a small relative of jellyfish, arguably has the simplest nervous system known—a nerve net. If you poke the hydra anywhere, it gives a generalized response. It shows no evidence of selectively processing some pokes while strategically ignoring others. The split between the ancestors of hydras and other animals, according to genetic analysis, may have been as early as 700 million years ago. Selective signal enhancement probably evolved after that.

The arthropod eye, on the other hand, has one of the best-studied examples of selective signal enhancement. It sharpens the signals related to visual edges and suppresses other visual signals, generating an outline sketch of the world. Selective enhancement therefore probably evolved sometime between hydras and arthropods—between about 700 and 600 million years ago, close to the beginning of complex, multicellular life. Selective signal enhancement is so primitive that it doesn’t even require a central brain. The eye, the network of touch sensors on the body, and the auditory system can each have their own local versions of attention focusing on a few select signals.

The next evolutionary advance was a centralized controller for attention that could coordinate among all senses. In many animals, that central controller is a brain area called the tectum. (“Tectum” means “roof” in Latin, and it often covers the top of the brain.) It coordinates something called overt attention – aiming the satellite dishes of the eyes, ears, and nose toward anything important.

All vertebrates—fish, reptiles, birds, and mammals—have a tectum. Even lampreys have one, and they appeared so early in evolution that they don’t even have a lower jaw. But as far as anyone knows, the tectum is absent from all invertebrates. The fact that vertebrates have it and invertebrates don’t allows us to bracket its evolution. According to fossil and genetic evidence, vertebrates evolved around 520 million years ago. The tectum and the central control of attention probably evolved around then, during the so-called Cambrian Explosion when vertebrates were tiny wriggling creatures competing with a vast range of invertebrates in the sea.

The tectum is a beautiful piece of engineering. To control the head and the eyes efficiently, it constructs something called an internal model, a feature well known to engineers. An internal model is a simulation that keeps track of whatever is being controlled and allows for predictions and planning. The tectum’s internal model is a set of information encoded in the complex pattern of activity of the neurons. That information simulates the current state of the eyes, head, and other major body parts, making predictions about how these body parts will move next and about the consequences of their movement. For example, if you move your eyes to the right, the visual world should shift across your retinas to the left in a predictable way. The tectum compares the predicted visual signals to the actual visual input, to make sure that your movements are going as planned. These computations are extraordinarily complex and yet well worth the extra energy for the benefit to movement control. In fish and amphibians, the tectum is the pinnacle of sophistication and the largest part of the brain. A frog has a pretty good simulation of itself.

With the evolution of reptiles around 350 to 300 million years ago, a new brain structure began to emerge – the wulst. Birds inherited a wulst from their reptile ancestors. Mammals did too, but our version is usually called the cerebral cortex and has expanded enormously. It’s by far the largest structure in the human brain. Sometimes you hear people refer to the reptilian brain as the brute, automatic part that’s left over when you strip away the cortex, but this is not correct. The cortex has its origin in the reptilian wulst, and reptiles are probably smarter than we give them credit for.

The cortex is like an upgraded tectum. We still have a tectum buried under the cortex and it performs the same functions as in fish and amphibians. If you hear a sudden sound or see a movement in the corner of your eye, your tectum directs your gaze toward it quickly and accurately. The cortex also takes in sensory signals and coordinates movement, but it has a more flexible repertoire. Depending on context, you might look toward, look away, make a sound, do a dance, or simply store the sensory event in memory in case the information is useful for the future.

The most important difference between the cortex and the tectum may be the kind of attention they control. The tectum is the master of overt attention—pointing the sensory apparatus toward anything important. The cortex ups the ante with something called covert attention. You don’t need to look directly at something to covertly attend to it. Even if you’ve turned your back on an object, your cortex can still focus its processing resources on it. Scientists sometimes compare covert attention to a spotlight. (The analogy was first suggested by Francis Crick, the geneticist.) Your cortex can shift covert attention from the text in front of you to a nearby person, to the sounds in your backyard, to a thought or a memory. Covert attention is the virtual movement of deep processing from one item to another.

The cortex needs to control that virtual movement, and therefore like any efficient controller it needs an internal model. Unlike the tectum, which models concrete objects like the eyes and the head, the cortex must model something much more abstract. According to the AST, it does so by constructing an attention schema—a constantly updated set of information that describes what covert attention is doing moment-by-moment and what its consequences are.

Consider an unlikely thought experiment. If you could somehow attach an external speech mechanism to a crocodile, and the speech mechanism had access to the information in that attention schema in the crocodile’s wulst, that technology-assisted crocodile might report, “I’ve got something intangible inside me. It’s not an eyeball or a head or an arm. It exists without substance. It’s my mental possession of things. It moves around from one set of items to another. When that mysterious process in me grasps hold of something, it allows me to understand, to remember, and to respond.”

The crocodile would be wrong, of course. Covert attention isn’t intangible. It has a physical basis, but that physical basis lies in the microscopic details of neurons, synapses, and signals. The brain has no need to know those details. The attention schema is therefore strategically vague. It depicts covert attention in a physically incoherent way, as a non-physical essence. And this, according to the theory, is the origin of consciousness. We say we have consciousness because deep in the brain, something quite primitive is computing that semi-magical self-description. Alas crocodiles can’t really talk. But in this theory, they’re likely to have at least a simple form of an attention schema.

When I think about evolution, I’m reminded of Teddy Roosevelt’s famous quote, “Do what you can with what you have where you are.” Evolution is the master of that kind of opportunism. Fins become feet. Gill arches become jaws. And self-models become models of others. In the AST, the attention schema first evolved as a model of one’s own covert attention. But once the basic mechanism was in place, according to the theory, it was further adapted to model the attentional states of others, to allow for social prediction. Not only could the brain attribute consciousness to itself, it began to attribute consciousness to others.

When psychologists study social cognition, they often focus on something called theory of mind, the ability to understand the possible contents of someone else’s mind. Some of the more complex examples are limited to humans and apes. But experiments show that a dog can look at another dog and figure out, “Is he aware of me?” Crows also show an impressive theory of mind. If they hide food when another bird is watching, they’ll wait for the other bird’s absence and then hide the same piece of food again, as if able to compute that the other bird is aware of one hiding place but unaware of the other. If a basic ability to attribute awareness to others is present in mammals and in birds, then it may have an origin in their common ancestor, the reptiles. In the AST’s evolutionary story, social cognition begins to ramp up shortly after the reptilian wulst evolved. Crocodiles may not be the most socially complex creatures on earth, but they live in large communities, care for their young, and can make loyal if somewhat dangerous pets.

If AST is correct, 300 million years of reptilian, avian, and mammalian evolution have allowed the self-model and the social model to evolve in tandem, each influencing the other. We understand other people by projecting ourselves onto them. But we also understand ourselves by considering the way other people might see us. Data from my own lab suggests that the cortical networks in the human brain that allow us to attribute consciousness to others overlap extensively with the networks that construct our own sense of consciousness.

Language is perhaps the most recent big leap in the evolution of consciousness. Nobody knows when human language first evolved. Certainly we had it by 70 thousand years ago when people began to disperse around the world, since all dispersed groups have a sophisticated language. The relationship between language and consciousness is often debated, but we can be sure of at least this much: once we developed language, we could talk about consciousness and compare notes. We could say out loud, “I’m conscious of things. So is she. So is he. So is that damn river that just tried to wipe out my village.”

Maybe partly because of language and culture, humans have a hair-trigger tendency to attribute consciousness to everything around us. We attribute consciousness to characters in a story, puppets and dolls, storms, rivers, empty spaces, ghosts and gods. Justin Barrett called it the Hyperactive Agency Detection Device, or HADD. One speculation is that it’s better to be safe than sorry. If the wind rustles the grass and you misinterpret it as a lion, no harm done. But if you fail to detect an actual lion, you’re taken out of the gene pool. To me, however, the HADD goes way beyond detecting predators. It’s a consequence of our hyper-social nature. Evolution turned up the amplitude on our tendency to model others and now we’re supremely attuned to each other’s mind states. It gives us our adaptive edge. The inevitable side effect is the detection of false positives, or ghosts.

And so the evolutionary story brings us up to date, to human consciousness—something we ascribe to ourselves, to others, and to a rich spirit world of ghosts and gods in the empty spaces around us. The AST covers a lot of ground, from simple nervous systems to simulations of self and others. It provides a general framework for understanding consciousness, its many adaptive uses, and its gradual and continuing evolution.”

https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/06/how-consciousness-evolved/485558/

How does money affect morality?

“Our actions are guided by moral values. However, monetary incentives can get in the way of our good intentions. Neuroeconomists at the University of Zurich have now investigated in which area of the brain conflicts between moral and material motives are resolved. Their findings reveal that our actions are more social when these deliberations are inhibited. When donating money to a charity or doing volunteer work, we put someone else’s needs before our own and forgo our own material interests in favor of moral values. Studies have described this behavior as reflecting either a personal predisposition for altruism, an instrument for personal reputation management, or a mental trade-off of the pros and cons associated with different actions.

Impact of electromagnetic stimulation on donating behavior

A research team led by UZH professor Christian Ruff from the Zurich Center for Neuroeconomics has now investigated the neurobiological origins of unselfish behavior. The researchers focused on the right Temporal Parietal Junction (rTPJ) — an area of the brain that is believed to play a crucial role in social decision-making processes. To understand the exact function of the rTPJ, they engineered an experimental set-up in which participants had to decide whether and how much they wanted to donate to various organizations. Through electromagnetic stimulation of the rTPJ, the researchers were then able to determine which of the three types of considerations — predisposed altruism, reputation management, or trading off moral and material values — are processed in this area of the brain.

Moral by default, money by deliberation

The researchers found that people have a moral preference for supporting good causes and not wanting to support harmful or bad causes. However, depending on the strength of the monetary incentive, people will at one point switch to selfish behavior. When the authors reduced the excitability of the rTPJ using electromagnetic stimulation, the participants’ moral behavior remained more stable.

“If we don’t let the brain deliberate on conflicting moral and monetary values, people are more likely to stick to their moral convictions and aren’t swayed, even by high financial incentives,” explains Christian Ruff. According to the neuroeconomist, this is a remarkable finding, since: “In principle, it’s also conceivable that people are intuitively guided by financial interests and only take the altruistic path as a result of their deliberations.”

Brain region mediates conflicts

Although people’s decisions were more social when they thought that their actions were being watched, this behavior was not affected by electromagnetic stimulation of the rTPJ. This means that considerations regarding one’s reputation are processed in a different area of the brain. In addition, the electromagnetic stimulation led to no difference in the general motivation to help. Therefore, the authors concluded that the rTPJ is not home to altruistic motives per se, but rather to the ability to trade off moral and material values.

Experimental set-up

In the experimental set-up, the participants received money and were then presented with the opportunity to donate a varying sum to a charitable cause, at a cost to themselves, or donate a sum to an organization that supports the use of firearms, in which case they were rewarded. Some of these decisions were taken while other participants were watching, whereas others were taken in secret.

The researchers then analyzed the decisions the participants took, determining the monetary thresholds at which the participants switched from altruistic to selfish behavior. They compared these findings in settings with and without magnetic stimulation of the rTPJ area.

Story Source:

Materials provided by University of ZurichNote: Content may be edited for style and length.

Journal Reference:

  1. Ignacio Obeso, Marius Moisa, Christian C Ruff, Jean-Claude Dreher. A causal role for right temporo-parietal junction in signaling moral conflicteLife, 2018; 7 DOI: 10.7554/eLife.40671

With no laws or rules to influence your behavior…

“Fundamentally people behave in a social and rather compassionate and “good” way rather than aggressively, even without specified rules. That is the result of a study from the Institute for Science of Complex Systems at the MedUni Vienna under the leadership of Stefan Thurner and Michael Szell. They analysed the behaviour of more than 400,000 participants of the “Virtual Life” game “Pardus” on the Internet. The findings are that only two percent of all actions are aggressive, even though the game would make it easy for war-like attacks with spaceships, for example.

Millions of human interactions were assessed during the study which included actions such as communication, founding and ending friendships, trading goods, sleeping, moving, however also starting hostilities, attacks and punishment. The game does not suggest any rules and everyone can live with their avatar (i.e. with their “game character” in the virtual world) as they choose. “And the result of this is not anarchy”, says Thurner. “The participants organise themselves as a social group with good intents. Almost all the actions are positive.”

The interactions were fed into an “alphabet” by the researchers, “similar to how the genetic code of DNA was decoded 15 years ago”, says Thurner. “From this we get a pattern which reflects how people tick”. However, there is quite a high potential for aggression: so, for example, if a negative action is inflicted, the probability that the player will subsequently also act aggressively shoots up more than tenfold, even to about 30 percent.

Thurner and his team were also able to present by means of the pattern that the whole game is a reflection of reality. “For example, we could adopt measured values one for one for communication networks. A further measurement is that almost no one has more than 150 friends, the so-called Dunbar’s number, regardless of whether in the real or the virtual world.” The study has now been published in the specialist journal PLoS One.

The long-term aim is to detect “phase transitions in societies” early on using these measurements and the behavioural patterns researched in the virtual world in order to be able to forecast group dynamic social processes and to be able to react in the event of these cases in good time. “It is possible, for example, that through certain conditions the aggression level, that has increased tenfold, remains extensively in place and therefore systemically for a longer time, which bears comparison with a drastic radicalisation in societies. Consequently, we could react to it in good time.” A current example for such a phase transition in society has been the relatively surprising “Arab Spring” with its many protests, uprisings and revolutions, which, as is well known, were targeted against the ruling totalitarian regimes in many countries.”

If you could create a country from scratch, what would it be like?

New Canada – It is a country that my friend and I have been creating over the past couple of years. Goverment – The Executive Branch consists of a Prime Co-Chancellor and a Sub Co-Chancellor, who are mostly all-powerful. The Legislative Branch consists of about 4 people, 2 of which are the current Co-Chancellors, they are mostly useless, only used by the Co-Chancellors, when they are in dispute. There is also a large legal codex, which I, as the Prime Co-Chancellor, cannot find for my Sub Co-Chancellor wrote it and subsequently hid it. The government is part of 706, Inc., which has many departments, such as DAS, the Department of Astronautical Services, and the DRD, the Department of Redundacy Department, etcetera. 706’s, and New Canada’s, main product/export is slightly irradiated chocolate milk, with convenient radiation kits in the cap. We have a colonized space station, and a colony on the moon, both of which are self-sustaining.

Tech

We have the most advanced tech on the planet including scifi-like shields and plasma guns, although we would have trouble winning a war due to the size of our armed forces being at most 5 people, although all are in power armor.

Land

We have the capital province of New Canada, and the provinces of New Quebec, and New New Canada.

Currency

Our main currency is the Shilling, which is worth millions of USD, due to the fact there are maybe 2o total coins.

The entire country is based off my Minecraft games with my friends.”